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inequitable, disliked?






 social aspects of carbon tax reform and revenue recycling
 public acceptability
 suitable topic for a policy discussion
 Methods
 CGE simulations
 representative choice experiment and other surveys
 State of the project
 CGE results
 working paper on the choice experiment
 SFOE report
 no CGE paper yet
Introduction
Structure of the talk
 The project: SEPIA
 Literature on carbon taxes and income distribution
 Model and data
 Scenarios
 Results
 Carbon taxes: efficient? inequitable? disliked?
 How (not) to design and promote carbon taxes in Switzerland
Introduction
The SEPIA project
 Title: Social Cushioning of Energy Price Increases and Public Acceptability
 Project components:
 Simulations with the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model GENESwIS:
 How do revenue recycling options affect income distribution and efficiency?
 Representative national survey (choice experiment) with 1200 respondents:
 What design of CO2 levies is most acceptable to citizens?
 Integrated analysis:
 Respondents are informed about the simulation results.
 Search for acceptable, environmentally effective and efficient designs.
Introduction
Project partners:
Econability (lead): Frank Vöhringer, Dario Stocker, Wolfgang Knoke, Sophie Maire
Haute Ecole de Gestion de Genève: Stefano Carattini, Andrea Baranzini
Université de Genève: Frédéric Varone
EPFL-LEURE: Philippe Thalmann
Financing: Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE), research programme “Energy – Economy – Society”
Distributional effects depend on recycling
A carbon tax is regressive
USA, Metcalf 1999
Revenue recycling can help
10 EU Member States, Barker and Köhler 1998
USA, Rausch et al. 2011
Revenue recycling by:
 income tax reduction regressive
 lump-sum per capita progressive
Literature
A carbon tax is mildly progressive with revenue
recycling through the income tax
USA regional, Oladosu and Rose 2006
 source of income effect is progressive
Literature
... and on the region
A carbon tax is highly progressive even before
revenue recycling
British Columbia (Canada), Beck et al. 2015
 use of income effect is small (electricity mostly from hydro)
 source of income effect dominates (high income households with a
higher share of labor income; capital mobility assumed)





use of income effect is progressive
 higher income households spend more on vehicle fuels
 lowest income households cannot afford public transport
source of income effect is progressive
 higher income households receive factor income from sectors
strongly affected by fuel tax reform
Literature
Developing and emerging economies
Revenue recycling lump-sum per capita is the
(only) progressive option
Ecoplan 2012 and Imhof 2012
 But: trade-off between efficiency and equity
 Imhof 2012: “If distributional equity is considered as well, per-
capita lump-sum rebatement leads to a progressive tax reform at a
moderate cost”
 Ecoplan 2012:
 households with kids benefit strongly from lump-sum payments




 computable general equilibrium model
 dynamic-recursive version
 multi-sectoral single country model with Armington trade
 15 private household categories
 taxes, public budget & equal yield constraint









GENESwIS: sectoral cost functions
Model and data
GENESwIS: Elasticities of substition
 Industry & services: Mohler/Müller 2012 & Ban/Okagawa 2008
 Doubling in 25 years





• working population with vs. without children, retired population
• each group differentiated into 5 groups of standard of living
 spatial differentiation:
• inner cities, agglomerations, rural households
• each group differentiated into 5 groups of standard of living
 Data from household budget surveys 2007/2008
 aggregated by Ecoplan (Ecoplan 2012) to fit 2008 energy IO table
(Nathani et al. 2013)
 substantial data manipulation necessary
Model and data
Household data: some observations
 The share of expenditure for energy decreases in income.
 Tax and contribution ratios are U-shaped in income.
 Main reason: health insurance.
 The tax system is mildly progressive (with large cantonal differences).
 Pensioners have
 a higher per capita income,
 a higher tax ratio (but they hardly pay social security contributions),
 a higher expenditure share of heating fuels (3.6% vs. 2.3%),
 a lower expenditure share of transport fuels (1.4% vs. 2.3%).
 Rural households have
 a lower per capita income,
 a higher expenditure share for transport fuels than inner city
households (2.3% vs. 1.5%),
 but a lower expenditure share for heating fuels (2.1% vs. 3.1%).
Model and data
Household data: children
 Having children increases the probability of belonging to the
bottom quintile as well as to the two bottom quintiles:
bottom 20% bottom 40%
 kids 26.3% 54.0%
 no kids 10.0% 25.6%
 The share of labor income is higher (79.8% vs. 63.9%)
 The income share of social benefits is lower (14.0% vs. 24.9%)
Model and data
GENESwIS: Marginal tax rates
Model and data
GENESwIS: Endogenous tax rate changes
 The model taxes activities at marginal rates.
 Transfers ensure that tax payments correspond to average rates.
 Equal yield: marginal tax rates are endogenous.
 Average tax rates also need to be endogenous -> adjust transfers.
Model and data
Scenarios and recycling variants
Scenarios
 Baseline: “weiter wie bisher” (Prognos 2012)
 Policy scenario: CO2 targets of the new energy policy
 International offset prices: 10 CHF/t in 2015; +10% per year
 Imperfect social targeting: 70% - 25% - 5% - 0% - 0%
CO2 tax rates (CHF2008/t)
Results
GHG emissions (in Mt CO2e)
Results
Impact on aggregate welfare
Results

























































































































GHG emissions (offset scenarios, in Mt CO2e)
Results
Impact on aggregate welfare (offset scenarios)
Results
Insights from the surveys
 very little support for high carbon tax rates
 very little support for pure tax reforms
 in the setting of a choice experiment, information is key to the
acceptability of efficient and equitable designs
 Informing about the environmental effectiveness of the CO2 levy reduces
the (generally strong) demand for environmental earmarking of revenues.
 Informing about distributional effects leads to demands for progressive
designs.
Acceptability
Example of a choice card
Acceptability
SEPIA references on acceptability
 Carattini, S., A. Baranzini, P. Thalmann, F. Varone and F. Vöhringer (2016):
Green taxes in a post-Paris world: are millions of nays inevitable?
(based on a representative choice experiment)
 Baranzini, A. and S. Carattini (2016): Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling:
testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data
(based on an unrepresentative survey in Geneva)
 Baranzini, A., M. Caliskan and S. Carattini 2014: Economic Prescriptions and
Public Responses to Climate Policy (based on interviews)
 Philippe Thalmann 2016: Quelle est l'utilisation préférée de la recette d'une taxe
sur l'énergie?
(analysis of the VOX survey on the Greenliberals’ energy tax initiative)
 All included in the report: Vöhringer et al. (2016): Social Cushioning of Energy
Price Increases and Public Acceptability, Swiss Federal Office of Energy.
Results
Efficient? Inequitable? Disliked?
 Efficient? Rather: potentially cost-effective.
 No double dividend for high tax rates (although they are needed for
ambitious targets, including the taxation of transport fuels).
 Good news from other studies: secondary benefits can be substantial.
 Marginal cost deviations due to voluntary commitments and emissions
trading are an issue for cost-effectiveness.
 Inequitable? Not necessarily.
 No serious social issues with CO2 tax reform: Setting aside a small portion of
the revenues for lump-sum recycling is sufficient to address them.
 No serious issues for the urban/rural divide (although rural households spend
more on transport fuels and less on heating fuels)
 Disliked? Yes.
 Especially when proposed tax rates are high.
 Serious doubts about the effectiveness.
 Serious fear for detrimental impacts on competitiveness.
 The concept of the double dividend is not understood.
Conclusions
Considerations for Switzerland: equity
 Transfers can be designed such that any distribution
goal can be reached (this study & 2nd theorem of welfare economics).
• Some instruments:
• health insurance lump sum payments or premium reductions
• child benefits
• old age pensions
• AVS/AHV contributions
• Difficulties:
• losers needed (no double dividend)
• difficult distributive politics due to apparent beneficiaries
• federalism: Who gets the tax revenues? Who pays the transfers?
• increased (federal) budget
• affected sectors (e.g. transport, natural gas and mineral oil)
• preference for ecological use of tax revenues
Conclusions
 clearly preferred by voters
• but less efficient (domestically) or equitable
• rescue through secondary benefits of domestic abatement?
• environmental programs with high benefits?
• existing domestic (compensation) schemes
• lack of projects?
• delineation between programs (Klik, EnAW, Cleantech)
• international offsets
• when counted towards the CH goal: cheaper than domestic
abatement
• mind the domestic CH goals (-30% in 2030 w.r.t. 1990)
• buying additional abatement is cheap and effective
• but: trust issues with international offsets




How (not) to design and promote carbon taxes
in Switzerland (to be discussed)
 Talk about climate and environment, not double dividends.
 Inform about the effectiveness of carbon taxes.
 Inform about the compatibility of carbon taxes with economic and
social objectives.
 Finance environmental programs (but which ones?).
 Set aside some revenue for lump-sum recycling to address social
concerns.
 Also reduce taxes to improve the efficiency of the reform (too
complicated?).
 Make the lump-sum recycling visible (send a check or at least let
Parliament discuss about it).
 Communicate about bonuses for desirable environmental behavior
(instead of punishment through taxes, e.g. “Lenkungsabgabe”).
